A computational glimpse at the Leibniz and Frege hierarchies by Moraschini, T.
A COMPUTATIONAL GLIMPSE AT THE LEIBNIZ AND FREGE
HIERARCHIES
TOMMASO MORASCHINI
Abstract. In this paper we consider, from a computational point of view,
the problem of classifying logics within the Leibniz and Frege hierarchies
typical of abstract algebraic logic. The main result states that, for logics
presented syntactically, this problem is in general undecidable. More
precisely, we show that there is no algorithm that classifies the logic
of a finite consistent Hilbert calculus in the Leibniz and in the Frege
hierarchies.
Dedicated to Professor Josep Maria Font on the occasion of his retirement
1. Introduction
Abstract algebraic logic (AAL for short) is a field that studies uniformly
propositional logics [14, 11, 15, 16]. One of its main achievements is the
development of the so-called Leibniz and Frege hierarchies in which propo-
sitional logics are classified according to two different criteria. More pre-
cisely, the Leibniz hierarchy provides a taxonomy that classifies propositional
systems accordingly to the way their notions of logical equivalence and of
truth can be defined. Roughly speaking, the location of a logic inside the
Leibniz hierarchy reflects the strength of the relation that it enjoys with its
algebraic counterpart. In this sense, the Leibniz hierarchy revealed to be
a useful framework where to express general transfer theorems between
metalogical and algebraic properties. This is the case for example for super-
intuitionistic logics [10], where the Beth definability property corresponds
to the fact that epimorphisms are surjective [5, 4, 21, 22], and the deductive
interpolation corresponds to the amalgamation property [12, 21, 24]. On
the other hand, the Frege hierarchy offers a classification of logics according
to general replacement principles. Remarkably, some of these replacement
properties can be formulated semantically by asking that the different
elements in a model of the logic are separated by a deductive filter. This
is what happens for example in superintuitionistic logics, whose algebraic
semantics is given by varieties of Heyting algebras where logical filters are
just lattice filters.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the computational aspects of the
problem of classifying syntactically presented logics in the Leibniz and
Frege hierarchies. More precisely, we will consider the following problem:
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2 TOMMASO MORASCHINI
• Let K be a level of the Leibniz (resp. Frege) hierarchy. Is it possible to
decide whether the logic of a given finite consistent Hilbert calculus in a
finite language belongs to K?
It turns out that in general the answer is negative both for the Leibniz and
the Frege hierarchies. To show the first case, we reduce Hilbert’s tenth
problem on Diophantine equations to the problem of classifying the logic of
a (finite consistent) Hilbert calculus in the Leibniz hierarchy, thus obtaining
that also the last one is undecidable (Theorem 4.10). In the process we
will also describe and axiomatize a new logic, whose deductions mimic
the equational theory of commutative rings with unity (Theorem 4.6). In
order to prove that also the problem of classifying the logic of a (finite
and consistent) Hilbert calculus in the Frege hierarchy is undecidable, we
rely on the undecidability of the equational theory of relation algebras in a
single variable [26]. Remarkably, our proof shows that this classification
problem remains undecidable even if we restrict our attention to Hilbert
calculi that determine a finitary algebraizable logic (Theorem 5.3).
2. Preliminaries
Here we present a brief survey of the main definitions and results of
abstract algebraic logic we will make use of along the article; a systematic
exposition can be found for example in [6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16].
A closure operator over a set A is a monotone function C : P(A)→ P(A)
such that X ⊆ C(X) = C(C(X)) for every X ∈ P(A), and a closure system
on A is a family C ⊆ P(A) closed under arbitrary intersections and such
that A ∈ C. It is well known that the closed sets (fixed points) of a closure
operator form a closure system and that given a closure system C one
can define a closure operator C by letting C(X) =
⋂{Y ∈ C |X ⊆ Y} for
every X ∈ P(A). These transformations are indeed inverse to one another.
Therefore definitions and results established for closure operators transfer
naturally to closure systems and vice-versa. Let C ⊆ P(A) be a closure
system on A. We say that an element a ∈ A is a theorem of C if a ∈ ⋂ C.
Fixed an algebraic type L and a set X, we denote by Fm(X) the set
of formulas over L built up with variables in X and by Fm(X) the cor-
responding absolutely free algebra. In particular we fix a countable set
Var of variables x, y, z, etc., and we write Fm and Fm instead of Fm(Var)
and Fm(Var). Moreover, given a formula ϕ ∈ Fm, we write ϕ(x,~z) if the
variables of ϕ are among x and~z and x does not appear in~z. From now on
we assume that we are working with a fixed algebraic type.
By a logic L we understand a closure operator CL : P(Fm) → P(Fm)
which is structural in the sense that σCL ⊆ CLσ for every endomorphism
(i.e. substitution) σ : Fm → Fm. Given Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm we write Γ L` ϕ
instead of ϕ ∈ CL(Γ). Moreover, given Γ ∪ {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ Fm, we denote by
Γ, ϕ a`L ψ, Γ the fact that both Γ, ϕ `L ψ and Γ,ψ `L ϕ are true. Given
two logics L and L′, we write L 6 L′ if CL(Γ) ⊆ CL′(Γ) for every Γ ⊆ Fm.
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A logic L is consistent when there is a formula ϕ such that ∅ 0L ϕ. Since L
always denotes an arbitrary logic, we skip, in the formulation of our results,
assumptions like “let L be a logic”.
A logic L is finitary if for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm such that ϕ ∈ CL(Γ),
there is a finite subset Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that ϕ ∈ CL(Γ′). In this paper, we will
focus only on finitary logics. A rule is an expression of the form Γ ` ϕ,
where Γ ∪ {ϕ} is a finite set of formulas. Given two finite sets of formulas
Γ and Γ′, the expression Γ a` Γ′ is an abbreviation for the rules Γ ` ϕ and
Γ′ ` ψ for every ϕ ∈ Γ′ and ψ ∈ Γ. A Hilbert calculus is a set of rules. It
is well known that every Hilbert calculus determines a finitary logic and,
vice-versa, that every finitary logic is determined by a Hilbert calculus. An
Hilbert calculus is consistent, when so is the logic it determines. For the
notion of proof in a Hilbert calculus we refer the reader to [11, pag. 28].
We denote algebras with bold capital letters A, B, C, etc. (with universes
A, B, C, etc. respectively). We skip assumptions like “let A be an algebra”
in the formulation of our results. Given an algebra A, we denote its
congruence lattice by ConA. The identity relation on A is denoted by IdA.
Given θ ∈ ConA, we denote the natural surjection onto the quotient by
piθ : A → A/θ. A congruence θ ∈ ConA is compatible with a set F ⊆ A if
for every a, b ∈ A
if 〈a, b〉 ∈ θ and a ∈ F, then b ∈ F.
Given F ⊆ A, there exists always that largest congruence on A compatible
with F [14, Theorem 4.20]. We denote it by ΩAF and call it the Leibniz
congruence of F on A. The Leibniz congruence can be characterized in terms
of the indiscernibility of elements with respect to filters in the following
way [14, Theorem 4.23]. Given an algebra A, a function p : An → A is a poly-
nomial function if there are a natural number m, a formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn+m),
and elements b1, . . . , bm ∈ A such that
p(a1, . . . , an) = ϕA(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm)
for every a1, . . . , an ∈ A. Observe that the notation ϕ(x1, . . . , xn+m) means
just that the variables really occurring in ϕ are among, but are not neces-
sarily all, the elements of {x1, . . . , xn+m}. We denote by PolA the set of all
polynomial functions of A.
Lemma 2.1. Let A be an algebra, F ⊆ A and a, b ∈ A. 〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩAF if and only
if for every unary p ∈ PolA,
p(a) ∈ F ⇐⇒ p(b) ∈ F.
A matrix is a pair 〈A, F〉 such that F ⊆ A. The set F is called the filter or the
truth set of the matrix. A matrix 〈A, F〉 is reduced if ΩAF = IdA.
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Given a logic L and an algebra A, we say that a set F ⊆ A is a deductive
filter of L over A when
if Γ L` ϕ, then for every homomorphism h : Fm→ A,
if h[Γ] ⊆ F, then h(ϕ) ∈ F
for every Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ Fm. We denote by FiLA the set of deductive filters of L
over A, which turns out to be a closure system [14, Proposition 2.22]. Thus,
we denote by FiAL(·) the closure operator of L-filter generation over the
algebra A. The class of reduced models of a given a logic L is the following:
Mod∗L := {〈A, F〉 : F ∈ FiLA and ΩAF = IdA}.
Given an algebra A, a logic L and a set F ⊆ A, the congruence
∼
ΩALF :=
⋂{ΩAG : G ∈ FiLA and F ⊆ G}
is called the Suszko congruence of F over A (relative to L). The Suszko
congruence allows to associate a special class of algebras with a given logic
L as follows:
AlgL := {A : there is F ∈ FiLA such that ∼ΩALF = IdA}.
3. The hierarchies of AAL
One of the main achievements of abstract algebraic logic is the develop-
ment of the so-called Leibniz and Frege hierarchies, in which propositional
logics L are classified by means of properties that reflect the strength (or
weakness) of the relation that they enjoy with AlgL. We begin by describing
the main classes of logics that constitute the Leibniz hierarchy (see Figure
1, where arrows denote the inclusion relation). In order to follow a uniform
approach we chose to do this from a semantic point of view, even if some
of these concepts were originally defined in some different ways. The main
idea, which lies behind the development of the Leibniz hierarchy, is that
propositional logics can be characterized by means of two basic features:
the fact that logical equivalence (which is identified with the Leibniz con-
gruence) is definable by means of formulas, and the fact that the truth sets
in Mod∗L are definable either implicitly or by means of equations.
A logic L is protoalgebraic if there is a set of formulas ρ(x, y,~z) in two
variables x and y (possibly) with parameters ~z such that for every algebra
A, every F ∈ FiLA and every a, b ∈ A
〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩAF ⇐⇒ ρA(a, b,~c) ⊆ F for every ~c ∈ A. (1)
In this case ρ(x, y,~z) is a set of congruence formulas with parameters for
L. Analogously, a logic is called equivalential if there is set of formulas
ρ(x, y) in two variables and without parameters which satisfies (1). In this
case ρ(x, y,~z) is called a set of congruence formulas for L. Protoalgebraic
logics can be characterized syntactically as follows [14, Proposition 6.7
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Figure 1. The Leibniz hierarchy.
and Theorem 6.57]. A set of formulas in two variables ρ(x, y) is a set of
protoimplication formulas for a logic L if the following conditions hold:
∅ `L ρ(x, x) (R)
x, ρ(x, y) `L y (MP)
Theorem 3.1. A logic L is protoalgebraic if and only if it has a set of protoimpli-
cation formulas.
Truth is equationally definable in a class of matrices M if there is a set τ(x)
of equations in variable x such that for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ M,
F = {a ∈ A : A  τ(a)}.
Truth is implicitly definable in a class of matrices M if the matrices in M are
determined by their algebraic reducts, in the sense that if 〈A, F〉, 〈A, G〉 ∈ M,
then F = G. Clearly equational definability implies implicit definability. A
logic L is truth-equational if truth is equationally definable in Mod∗L.
A logic L is weakly algebraizable if it is both protoalgebraic and truth-
equational. It is algebraizable if it is both equivalential and truth-equational.
Algebraizable logics enjoy the following syntactic characterization [14,
Theorem 3.21]:
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Theorem 3.2. A logic L is algebraizable if and only if there are a set of equations
τ(x) and a set of formulas ρ(x, y) such that:
∅ `Lρ(x, x) (R)
x, ρ(x, y) `Ly (MP)⋃
i6n
ρ(xi, yi) `Lρ(λx1 . . . xn,λy1 . . . yn) (Rep)
x a`L{ϕ(ε, δ) : ϕ(x, y) ∈ ρ and ε ≈ δ ∈ τ} (A3)
for every n-ary function symbol λ. In this case ρ(x, y) a set of congruence for-
mulas for L.
Lemma 3.3. Let L be an algebraizable logic with set of congruence formulas
ρ(x, y). For every ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm, we have
∅ `L ρ(ϕ,ψ)⇐⇒ AlgL  ϕ ≈ ψ.
A logic L is assertional if there is a class K of algebras with a constant
term 1 such that for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ `L ϕ⇐⇒ for every A ∈ K and homomorphism h : Fm→ A,
if h[Γ] ⊆ {1}, then h(ϕ) = 1.
A logic L is regularly (weakly) algebraizable if it is assertional and (weakly)
algebraizable. Regularly algebraizable logics enjoy a syntactic characteriza-
tion [14, Theorem 3.52].
Lemma 3.4. Let L be an algebraizable logic. L is regularly algebraizable if and
only if
x, y `L ρ(x, y) (G)
for some (or, equivalently, every) of its sets of congruence formulas ρ(x, y).
Finally a logic L is finitely equivalential (resp. finitely algebraizable, finitely
regularly algebraizable) if it is equivalential (resp. algebraizable, regularly
algebraizable) and it has a finite set of congruence formulas.
Now we turn to describe briefly the structure of the other hierarchy
typical of abstract algebraic logic, namely the Frege hierarchy (see Figure
2, where arrows denote the inclusion relation). In this hierarchy logics are
classified by means of general replacement properties, but we choose here
to define them by the most convenient equivalent characterization. A logic
L is selfextensional if the relation a`L is a congruence on Fm. In particular,
we will make use of the following easy observation [15, Proposition 2.43].
Lemma 3.5. Let L be selfextensional and α, β ∈ Fm. If α a`L β, then AlgL 
α ≈ β.
A logic L is fully selfextensional if for every A ∈ AlgL and a, b ∈ A:
if FiAL{a} = FiAL{b}, then a = b.
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Figure 2. The Frege hierarchy.
Fully selfextensional logics are also selfextensional, while the converse is
not true in general [2]. A logic L is Fregean if for every n-ary function
symbol λ and formulas Γ ∪ {α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn} ⊆ Fm, if Γ, αi a`L βi, Γ
for every i 6 n, then Γ,λ(α1, . . . , αn) a`L λ(β1, . . . , βn), Γ. Finally L is
fully Fregean if for every algebra A ∈ AlgL and every F ∈ FiLA we have
that
if FiAL(F ∪ {a}) = FiAL(F ∪ {b}), then 〈a, b〉 ∈ ∼ΩALF.
4. The classification problem in the Leibniz hierarchy
We will begin our tour around some computational aspects of abstract
algebraic logic by considering the problem of classifying logics in the
Leibniz hierarchy. The goal of this part is to prove that the problem
of classifying logics determined by a finite consistent Hilbert calculus
in a finite language in the Leibniz hierarchy is in general undecidable
(Theorem 4.10). Our strategy is the following: for every Diophantine
equation p ≈ 0 we define a finite consistent Hilbert calculus L(p) such that
L(p) belongs to a given level of the Leibniz hierarchy if and only if p ≈ 0
has an integer solution (Definition 4.7 and Theorem 4.8). For the sake of
completeness we recall some concepts. An algebra A = 〈A,+, ·,−, 0, 1〉 of
type 〈2, 2, 1, 0, 0〉 is a commutative ring if 〈A,+,−, 0〉 is an Abelian group,
〈A, ·, 1〉 is a commutative monoid, and
a · (b + c) = (a · b) + (a · c)
for every a, b, c ∈ A. We denote by CR the variety of commutative rings.
The algebra Z := 〈Z,+, ·,−, 0, 1〉, where Z is the collection of integer
numbers, is a commutative ring. A Diophantine equation is an equation of
the form p(z1, . . . , z1) ≈ 0, where p(z1, . . . , z1) is a term in the language of
commutative rings. Hilbert’s tenth problem asked for an algorithm that,
given a Diophantine equation, tells us whether it has a solution in Z or not.
Matiyasevich showed that such an algorithm does not exist [25], see also [3].
In other words, the problem of determining whether a given Diophantine
equation has an integer solution is undecidable.
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In order to relate this problem to the one of the classification of logics into
the Leibniz hierarchy, we will construct a logic that mimics the behaviour
of (Diophantine) equations in commutative rings. In [17] (see also [19]) a
way of doing this for arbitrary varieties is described. More precisely, given
a non-trivial variety V, we let LV be the logic determined by the following
class of matrices:
{〈A, F〉 : A ∈ V and F ⊆ A}.
Given Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm, we will write Γ `V ϕ as a shortening for Γ `LV ϕ.
The following result will be used later on:
Lemma 4.1. Let V be a non-trivial variety and Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm.
1. Alg∗LV ⊆ AlgLV = V.
2. LV is fully selfextensional.
3. Γ `V ϕ if and only if there is γ ∈ Γ such that V  γ ≈ ϕ.
Proof. Point 1 and 2 are respectively Theorem 3.5 and Corollary 3.6 of [17].
Point 3, even if not explicit stated there, is a direct consequence of Lemmas
3.3 and 3.9 of [17]. 
Digression. Next we are going to axiomatize the logic LCR, but first
let us consider the general problem of axiomatizing the logic LV for an
arbitrary non-trivial variety V. Suppose that we are given an equational
basis Σ for V. It would be nice to have a natural way of transforming Σ
into an axiomatization of the logic LV. This can be done easily, adapting
Birkhoff’s Completeness Theorem of equational logic [9, Theorem 14.19,
Section II], if what we are looking for is a Gentzen system adequate to LV
[20, Theorem 1.2].1 On the contrary, it is not straightforward to build a
nice Hilbert calculus for LV out of Σ. In particular, the obvious idea of
considering the logic axiomatized by the rules α a` β for all α ≈ β ∈ Σ
does not work in general. For example, it is the case that the logic S
determined by the rules
x a` x ∧ x x ∧ y a` y ∧ x x ∧ (y ∧ z) a` (x ∧ y) ∧ z (2)
is not the logic LSL associated with the variety of semilattices SL (cfr. [17,
Example 3.8]). This is because the matrix 〈Z3, {1, 2}〉, where Z3 is the
additive semigroup of integers modulo 3, is easily proved to be a reduced
model of S . In particular this implies that Z3 ∈ AlgS and, therefore, that
AlgS 6= SL. Hence S 6= LSL, by point 1 of Lemma 4.1. In order to obtain a
complete Hilbert-style axiomatization of LSL one has to add to the rules in
(2) the following ones:
u ∧ x a` u ∧ (x ∧ x)
u ∧ (x ∧ y) a` u ∧ (y ∧ x)
u ∧ (x ∧ (y ∧ z)) a` u ∧ ((x ∧ y) ∧ z)
1Even if we won’t pursue this here, it is possible to show that there is no Gentzen system
fully adequate to LV in the sense of [15].
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This is mainly due to the fact that selfextensionality, which is not eas-
ily expressible by means of Hilbert-style rules, fails for S , while LSL is
selfextensional by point 2 of Lemma 4.1.
Even if it is not straightforward to present an explicit Hilbert-style
axiomatization of LV, given a base Σ for V, one may wonder whether there
exists (no matter which one) a finite Hilbert-style axiomatization of LV
when Σ is finite. In the next example we show that in general this is not
the case.
Example 4.2 (Finite Axiomatizability). An algebra A = 〈A, ·〉 is a commu-
tative magma if · is a binary commutative operation. Clearly the class of
commutative magmas forms a finitely based variety, which we denote by
CM. We will prove that the logic LCM is not axiomatizable by means of a
finite set of Hilbert-style rules. In order to do this, let CM be a finite set
of rules holding in LCM. We will show that there is a model of CM that
is not a model of LCM. First observe that there is a natural number n that
bounds the number of occurrences of (possibly equal) variables in terms
appearing in the rules of CM. We can assume, without loss of generality,
that n > 2. Then we consider the algebra A = 〈{0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, ·〉 equipped
with a binary operation such that 1 · 2 := 2 and 2 · 1 := 1 and
a · b = b · a :=

a if a 6= n and b = 0
0 if a = n and b = 0
a if b = a− 1 and a > 3
a− 1 if b = a− 2 and a > 3
1 otherwise
for every a, b ∈ A such that {a, b} 6= {1, 2}.
We first show that 〈A, {0}〉 is not a model of LCM. Observe that A /∈ CM,
since 1 · 2 6= 2 · 1. By point 1 of Lemma 4.1 we know that it will be enough
to prove that 〈A, {0}〉 is a reduced matrix. By point 1 of Lemma 2.1 this
amounts to checking whether for every different a, b ∈ Ar {0} there is a
polynomial function p : A→ A such that p(a) = 0 if and only if p(b) 6= 0.
This is what we do now: consider a pair of different a, b ∈ Ar {0}. Assume,
without loss of generality, that a < b. Then we consider the polynomial
function
p(x) :=(. . . (((. . . ((. . . ((1 · 2) · 3) · . . . ) · a) · . . .
. . . · (b− 1)) · x) · (b + 1)) · . . . · n) · 0.
It is easy to see that p(b) = 0. Then we turn to show that p(a) 6= 0. We
consider two cases, whether b− 1 < 3 or not. First consider the case in
which b− 1 < 3. We have that either (a = 1 and b = 2) or (a = 1 and b = 3)
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or (a = 2 and b = 3). It is easy to prove that
if a = 1 and b = 2, then p(a) = n− 1
if a = 1 and b = 3, then p(a) = 1
if a = 2 and b = 3, then p(a) = 1.
Then we turn to the case in which 3 6 b− 1. We have that:
p(a) = (. . . ((b− 1 · a) · b + 1) . . . · n) · 0 =
{
n− 1 if a = b− 2
1 otherwise.
Therefore we obtain that p(a) 6= 0. This concludes the proof that 〈A, {0}〉
is not a model of LCM.
Now we turn to prove that 〈A, {0}〉 is a model of CM. Consider a
rule Γ ` ϕ in CM. Suppose that there is a homomorphism h : Fm → A
such that h[Γ] ⊆ {0}. From point 3 of Lemma 4.1 we know that there is
γ ∈ Γ such that CM  γ ≈ ϕ. In particular, we have that h(γ) = 0. We
claim that {h(ε), h(δ)} 6= {1, 2} for every subformula ε · δ of γ. Suppose
the contrary towards a contradiction. Then there is a subformula ε · δ
of γ such that {h(ε), h(δ)} = {1, 2}. Since at most n (possibly equal)
variables occur in γ, and ε · δ contains at least two of them, we know
that if we draw the subformulas tree of γ there are at most n− 2 nodes
γ1 < γ2 < · · · < γn−2 (with γn−2 = γ) strictly above ε · δ, where < is the
strict order of the subformulas tree. From the definition of · it follows
that 1 6 h(γm) 6 m + 2 for every m 6 n− 2. Therefore we obtain that
1 6 h(γ) 6 n, against the assumption that h(γ) = 0. This concludes the
proof of our claim.
Now, recall that CM  γ ≈ ϕ. It is possible to prove by induction on the
length of the proofs of Birkhoff’s equational logic that ϕ is obtained from γ
in the following way. We replace a subformula γ1 · γ2 of γ by γ2 · γ1 and
denote by γ′ the formula obtained in this way. Then we repeat this process
on γ′. Iterating this construction a finite number of times we reach ϕ. Now,
observe that the operation · in A commutes always except for the case in
which its arguments exhaust the set {1, 2}. This fact, together with our
claim and the observation on equational logic, implies that h(γ) = h(ϕ). In
particular, this means that h(ϕ) = 0. Hence 〈A, {0}〉 is a model of the rules
in CM. 
End of digression
The digression shows that the quest for a finite Hilbert-style axiomatiza-
tion of the logic LCR is not in principle a trivial one: such an axiomatization
may even fail to exist, as in the case of commutative magmas of Example
4.2. Nevertheless we will provide an explicit and finite Hilbert calculus for
the logic LCR (Theorem 4.6).
Definition 4.3. Let CR be the following Hilbert calculus (and the logic it
determines) in the language of commutative rings:
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w + (u · ((x · y) · z)) a` w + (u · (x · (y · z)) (A)
w + (u · (x · y)) a` w + (u · (y · x)) (B)
w + (u · (x · 1)) a` w + (u · x) (C)
w + (u · ((x + y) + z)) a` w + (u · (x + (y + z))) (D)
w + (u · (x + y)) a` w + (u · (y + x)) (E)
w + (u · (x + 0)) a` w + (u · x) (F)
w + (u · (x +−x)) a` w + (u · 0) (G)
w + (u · (x · (y + z))) a` w + (u · ((x · y) + (x · z))) (H)
w + (u · −(x + y)) a` w + (u · (−x +−y)) (I)
w + (u · −(x · y)) a` w + (u · (−x · y)) (L)
w + (u · −(x · y)) a` w + (u · (x · −y)) (M)
0+ x a` x (N)
x + (1 · y) a` x + y (O)
The following technical result about the special nature of deductions of
CR, will be useful in the subsequent proofs.
Lemma 4.4. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm. If Γ `CR ϕ, then there is γ ∈ Γ and a finite
sequence of formulas 〈α1, α2, . . . , αn〉 such that α1 = γ, αn = ϕ and for every
m < n there is a rule ε a` δ of the calculus CR and a substitution σ such that
{σε, σδ} = {αm, αm+1}.
Proof. The result follows from two observations. First, that the calculus CR
consists of rules with only one premise. Second, that if α ` β ∈ CR, then
β ` α ∈ CR too. 
Our main goal will be to prove that CR is in fact a finite axiomatization
of LCR. To do this we will make use of the following lemma, whose easy
proof (contained in the Appendix) involves some tedious calculations. The
reader may safely choose to skip it in order keep track of the proof of the
main result of the section.
Lemma 4.5. The logic CR is selfextensional.
Drawing consequences from the fact that CR is selfextensional, the
following result is easy to obtain.
Theorem 4.6. The rules CR provide a finite axiomatization of LCR.
Proof. First observe that each of the rules in CR corresponds to an equation,
which holds in CR. Together with point 3 of Lemma 4.1, this implies that
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CR 6 LCR. Now, applying (N) and (O), it is easy to prove that
(x · y) · z a`CR x · (y · z)
x · y a`CR y · x
x · 1 a`CR x
(x + y) + z a`CR x + (y + z)
x + y a`CR y + x
x + 0 a`CR x
x +−x a`CR 0
x · (y + z) a`CR (x · y) + (x · z)
Since CR is selfextensional by Lemma 4.5, we can apply Lemma 3.5 obtain-
ing AlgCR ⊆ CR. On the other hand, from point 1 of Lemma 4.1 and the
fact that CR 6 LCR, it follows that CR = AlgLCR ⊆ AlgCR. Therefore we
conclude that AlgCR = CR. Since for every A ∈ CR and F ⊆ A the matrix
〈A, F〉 is a model of LCR, this implies that LCR 6 CR. Thus we conclude
that CR = LCR as desired. 
Now that we have built the machinery necessary to speak about commu-
tative rings by means of the propositional logic LCR, we turn back to the
classification of logics determined by finite Hilbert calculi in the Leibniz
hierarchy. We begin by describing a general way of associating a logic with
each Diophantine equation.
Definition 4.7. Let p(z1, . . . , zn) ≈ 0 be a Diophantine equation and x and
y two new different variables. Let L(p) be the logic, in the language
of commutative rings expanded with a new binary operation symbol↔,
determined by the following Hilbert calculus:
∅ `x ↔ x (R)
x ↔ y `y↔ x (S)
x ↔ y, y↔ z `x ↔ z (T)
x ↔ y ` − x ↔ −y (Rep1)
x ↔ y, z↔ u `(x + z)↔ (y + u) (Rep2)
x ↔ y, z↔ u `(x · z)↔ (y · u) (Rep3)
x ↔ y, z↔ u `(x ↔ z)↔ (y↔ u) (Rep4)
p(z1, . . . , zn)↔ 0, x, x ↔ y `y (MP’)
p(z1, . . . , zn)↔ 0, x a`x ↔ (x ↔ x), p(z1, . . . , zn)↔ 0 (A3’)
p(z1, . . . , zn)↔ 0, x, y `x ↔ y (G’)
∅ `α↔ β (CR)
for every α a` β ∈ CR.
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Observe that L(p) is determined by an explicit finite Hilbert calculus
in a finite language. It turns out that there is a strong relation between
the existence of an integer solution to p(z1, . . . , zn) ≈ 0 and the location of
L(p) in the Leibniz hierarchy.
Theorem 4.8. Let p(z1, . . . , zn) ≈ 0 be a Diophantine equation. The following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) L(p) is finitely regularly algebraizable.
(ii) Truth is implicitly definable in Mod∗L(p).
(iii) L(p) is protoalgebraic.
(iv) The equation p(z1, . . . , zn) ≈ 0 has an integer solution.
Proof. Clearly (i) implies (ii) and (iii). Now we turn to prove (ii)⇒(iv). We
reason by contraposition. Suppose that p(z1, . . . , zn) ≈ 0 has no integer
solution. Now choose two different integers s and m. Then let Z be the
expansion of Z with a new binary function↔ defined as follows:
a↔ b :=
{
s if a = b
m otherwise
for every a, b ∈ Z. Pick k /∈ {s, m}. It is easy to check that 〈Z, {s}〉
and 〈Z, {s, k}〉 are models of L(p), since p(z1, . . . , zn) ≈ 0 has no integer
solution. Moreover they are reduced. In order to see this, pick two different
a, b ∈ Z and consider the polynomial function q(z) := a↔ z. We have that
q(a) = s and that q(b) = m /∈ {s, k}. By point 1 of Lemma 2.1 we conclude
both that 〈a, b〉 /∈ ΩZ{s} and that 〈a, b〉 /∈ ΩZ{s, k}. But this means that
there are two different reduced models of L(p) with the same algebraic
reduct and, therefore, that truth is not implicitly definable in Mod∗L(p).
Now we prove (iii)⇒(iv). Suppose that L(p) is protoalgebraic. Then
there is a set of protoimplication formulas ρ(x, y). In particular, we have
that x, ρ(x, y) `L(p) y. Then there is a finite proof pi of y from the premises
in {x}∪ ρ(x, y). Taking a closer look at the axiomatization of L(p), it is easy
to see that either an application of (MP’) or of (A3’) must occur in pi. This is
because the other rules yield complex conclusions. In particular, this implies
that there is a substitution σ such that x, ρ(x, y) `L(p) σp(z1, . . . , zn)↔ σ0.
From Theorem 3.1 we know that ∅ `L(p) ρ(x, x). In particular, this means
that x `L(p) σxσp(z1, . . . , zn) ↔ σxσ0, where σx is the substitution which
sends all variables to x. But observe that every substitution leaves 0 fixed.
Therefore we conclude that
x `L(p) σxσp(z1, . . . , zn)↔ 0. (3)
Now we consider the algebra Z built in the proof of part (ii)⇒(iv). It
is easy to check that 〈Z, {s}〉 is a model of L(p). Therefore, pick an
homomorphism h : Fm → Z that sends x to s. From (3) it follows that
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h(σxσp(z1, . . . , zn)↔ 0) = s. But observe that
h(σxσp(z1, . . . , zn)↔ 0) = s⇐⇒ h(p(σxσ(z1), . . . , σxσ(zn))↔ 0) = s
⇐⇒ pZ(hσxσ(z1), . . . , hσxσ(zn))↔ h0 = s
⇐⇒ pZ(hσxσ(z1), . . . , hσxσ(zn)) = h0
⇐⇒ pZ(hσxσ(z1), . . . , hσxσ(zn)) = 0.
Therefore we conclude that 〈hσxσ(z1), . . . , hσxσ(zn)〉 is an integer solution
to the equation p(z1, . . . , zn) ≈ 0.
It only remains to prove (iv)⇒(i). Suppose that the equation p(z1, . . . , zn) ≈
0 admits an integer solution. Recall that the free commutative ring with
free generators {z1, . . . , zn} is the polynomial ring Z[z1, . . . , zn]. Since Z
is a subalgebra of Z[z1, . . . , zn], this implies that there are constant terms
(in the language of commutative rings) α1, . . . , αn such that Z[z1, . . . , zn] 
p(α1, . . . , αn) ≈ 0 and, therefore, that CR  p(α1, . . . , αn) ≈ 0. From point
3 of Lemma 4.1 it follows that p(α1, . . . , αn) a`CR 0. By Theorem 4.6
this is equivalent to the fact that p(α1, . . . , αn) a`CR 0. Therefore we
can apply Lemma 4.4 obtaining a finite sequence 〈γ1,γ2, . . . ,γm〉, where
γ1 = p(α1, . . . , αn), γm = 0 and for every k < m there is a rule α a` β ∈ CR
and a substitution σ (in the language of commutative rings) such that
{σα, σβ} = {γk,γk+1}. Observe that σ can be regarded as a substitution
in the language of L(p) as well. Moreover, recall that α ↔ β is an axiom
of L(p) by (CR). Therefore, by structurality, we obtain ∅ `L(p) σα ↔ σβ.
Applying (S) if necessary, this yields that ∅ `L(p) γk ↔ γk+1. Hence we
proved that ∅ `L(p) γk ↔ γk+1 for every k 6 m− 1. Applying m− 1 times
(T) we conclude that
∅ `L(p) p(α1, . . . , αn)↔ 0. (4)
Recall that the variables x and y do not appear in the equation p(z1, . . . , zn) ≈
0 therefore, we can safely consider the substitution σ that sends zi to αi for
every i 6 n and leaves the other variables untouched. By (MP’), (A3’), (G’)
and (4) we obtain that
x, x ↔ y `L(p) y x a`L(p) x ↔ (x ↔ x) and x, y `L(p) x ↔ y.
Now it is easy to see that what we have proved is just the syntactic char-
acterization of algebraizability of Theorem 3.2 for τ(x) := {x ≈ x ↔ x}
and ρ(x, y) := {x ↔ y}. Therefore, with an application of Lemma 3.4, we
conclude that L(p) is finitely regularly algebraizable. 
Corollary 4.9. The logic L(p) is consistent for every Diophantine equation p ≈
0.
Proof. It is easy to see that the matrix 〈Z, {s}〉 defined in the above proof is
a model of L(p). Since {s} 6= Z, we conclude that L(p) is consistent. 
Observe that every class of the Leibniz hierarchy is contained either
into the class of protoalgebraic logic or into the one of logics L whose
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truth sets are implicitly definable in Mod∗L. Moreover every class of the
Leibniz hierarchy contains the one of finitely regularly algebraizable logics.
Keeping this is mind, Theorem 4.8 shows that the problem of determining
whether a logic of the form L(p) belong to a given level of the Leibniz
hierarchy is equivalent to the one of determining whether it belongs to
any level of the Leibniz hierarchy. This does not contradicts the fact that
in general these two problems are different. By means of this peculiar
feature of logics of the form L(p), we are able to establish at once the
undecidability of the various problems (one for each level of the Leibniz
hierarchy) of determining whether a logic belong to a given level of the
Leibniz hierarchy.
Theorem 4.10. Let K be a level of the Leibniz hierarchy in Figure 1. The problem
of determining whether the logic of a given consistent finite Hilbert calculus in a
finite language belongs to K is undecidable.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there is an algorithm A1 that,
given a consistent finite Hilbert calculus in a finite language, determines
whether its logic belongs to K. Then we define a new algorithm A2 as
follows: given a Diophantine equation p ≈ 0, we construct the logic
L(p) and check with A1 whether it belongs to K. Observe that we can
do this, since L(p) is consistent by Corollary 4.9. Then in the positive
case A2 returns yes, while no otherwise. Observe that K contains the
class of finitely regularly algebraizable logics and is included either in the
class of protoalgebraic logics or in the class of logics L whose truth sets
are implicitly definable in Mod∗L. Therefore we can apply Theorem 4.8,
yielding that:
L(p) ∈ K⇐⇒ p ≈ 0 has an integer solution.
Therefore A2 would provide a decision procedure for Hilbert’s tenth prob-
lem. Since we know that such a procedure does not exist, we obtain a
contradiction as desired. 
5. The classification problem in the Frege hierarchy
Now we move our attention to the problem of classifying logics in the
Frege hierarchy, which deals with several kinds of replacement properties.
Our goal is to prove a result analogous to the one obtained for the Leibniz
hierarchy. More precisely, we will show that the problem of classifying
the logic of a consistent finite Hilbert calculus in a finite language in the
Frege hierarchy is in general undecidable (Theorem 5.2). Remarkably, our
argument shows that this classification problem remains undecidable even
if we restrict our attention to Hilbert calculi that determine a finitary alge-
braizable logic. Our strategy is as follows. Consider a finitely based variety
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V of finite type, whose equational theory in one variable is undecidable.2
We will reduce the problem of determining the equational theory of V in
a single variable to the problem of classifying logics of finite consistent
Hilbert calculi in the Frege hierarchy.
Let Φ be a finite equational basis for the variety V, and let Eq(x) be the
set of all equations in the language of V in a single variable x. We will
introduce a new logic L(α, β) for each equation α ≈ β ∈ Eq(x).
Definition 5.1. Let α ≈ β ∈ Eq(x) and let L be the language of V, ex-
panded with two new connectives  and→, respectively unary and binary.
Then L(α, β) is the logic in the language L axiomatized by the following
Hilbert calculus:
∅ `x → x (R)
x, x → y `y (MP)
{xi → yi, yi → xi : 1 6 i 6 n} ` f (x1, . . . , xn)→ f (y1, . . . , yn) (Rep)
x a`x → x, x → x (A3)
∅ `ε→ δ, δ→ ε (V)
α(ϕ)→ β(ϕ) `ϕ (W)
for every ε ≈ δ ∈ Φ, every n-ary connective f , and every formula ϕ of the
following list:
ϕ1 :=x → (y→ x)
ϕ2 :=(x → (y→ z))→ ((x → y)→ (x → z))
ϕ3 :=(x1 → y1)→ ((y1 → x1)→ (· · · → ((xn → yn)→
→ ((yn → xn)→ ( f (~x)→ f (~y)))) . . . ))
ϕ4 :=x → (x → x)
ϕ5 :=x → (x → x)
ϕ6 :=(x → x)→ ((x → x)→ x)
again with f ranging over all n-ary for every n ∈ ω.
Observe that the syntactic characterization of algebraizability (Theorem
3.2) implies that L(α, β) is finitely algebraizable through
τ(x) = {x ≈ x} and ρ(x, y) = {x → y, y→ x}.
The next result expresses the relation between the validity of the equation
α ≈ β in V and the location of the logic L(α, β) in the Frege hierarchy.
Theorem 5.2. Let α ≈ β ∈ Eq(x). The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) L(α, β) is fully Fregean.
2Observe that examples of finitely based varieties of finite type, whose equational theory
in one variable is undecidable, are known. For instance, the variety of relation algebras is of
this kind, as shown in [26, Section 8.5(viii)]. Other examples are described in [18].
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(ii) L(α, β) is selfextensional.
(iii) V  α ≈ β.
Proof. (i)⇒(ii) is straightforward. Then we turn to prove (ii)⇒(iii). Suppose
towards a contradiction that L(α, β) is selfextensional and that V 2 α ≈ β.
Then let A ∈ V be the free algebra with countably many free generators. It
is well known that the universe of A consists of congruence classes of terms,
that we denote by JϕK, JψK . . . In particular, we denote the free generators
of A by {JzK : z ∈ Var}. In particular, consider the three distinct elementsJxK, JyK and JvK of A corresponding to the three distinct variables x, y and
v. Then expand A with two new unary and binary operations  and →
defined as
a :=
{ JyK if a = JxK
a otherwise a→ b :=
 JxK if a 6= bJyK if a = b 6= JxKJvK if a = b = JxK
for every a, b ∈ A. Let B be the result of the expansion and put F :=
Br {JxK}.
Claim 5.2.1. 〈B, F〉 ∈ Mod∗L(α, β).
First observe that 〈B, F〉 is a reduced matrix. To prove this, consider two
different elements a, b ∈ B and the polynomial function p(x) := x → a.
It is easy to see that p(a) ∈ F and p(b) /∈ F. By point 1 of Lemma
2.1 we conclude that 〈a, b〉 /∈ ΩBF and, therefore, that 〈B, F〉 is reduced.
Then we turn to prove that it is a model of L(α, β). The closure of F
under the rules axiomatizing L(α, β) is easily proved, except perhaps for
the set of rules (W). Consider a rule α(ϕ) → β(ϕ) ` ϕ in (W) and a
homomorphism h : Fm → B such that hα(ϕ) → hβ(ϕ) ∈ F. Clearly we
have that hα(ϕ) = hβ(ϕ). Since V 2 α ≈ β and A is the free relation algebra,
we know that h(ϕ) /∈ {JzK : z ∈ Var}. Together with the definition of F, this
implies that h(ϕ) ∈ F.
Now observe that both x → x and y → y are instances of (R) and,
therefore, they are theorems of L(α, β). In particular this means that
x → x a`L(α,β) y → y. Since L(α, β) is selfextensional, we obtain that
AlgL(α, β)  x → x ≈ y → y by Lemma 3.5. Let g : Fm → B the the
natural surjection, which sends z to JzK for every z ∈ Var. It is easy to see
that
g(x → x) = JvK 6= JyK = g(y→ y).
But from Claim 5.2.1 it follows that B ∈ AlgL. Therefore we reach a
contradiction as desired.
It only remains to prove part (iii)⇒(i). Suppose that V  α ≈ β. Recall
that L(α, β) is algebraizable with set of congruence formulas ρ(x, y) =
{x → y, y→ x}. By Lemma 3.3 we have that
∅ `L(α,β) ρ(γ, η)⇐⇒ AlgL(α, β)  γ ≈ η
18 TOMMASO MORASCHINI
for every γ, η ∈ Fm. Applying this observation to the axiom (V), we
conclude that AlgL(α, β) is a class of expansions of algebras in V. Together
with the fact that V  α ≈ β, this implies that α→ β is a theorem of L(α, β).
Then consider any i 6 7. By structurality α(ϕi) → β(ϕi) is a theorem of
L(α, β). Therefore we can apply the rules (W), obtaining that also ϕi is a
theorem of L(α, β).
Now, let L be the logic axiomatized only by {ϕi : i 6 6}, (V) and (MP).
Claim 5.2.2. L = L(α, β).
Clearly we have that L 6 L(α, β). To show the other direction, observe
that L satisfies the rules (W). Moreover, with an application of (MP) and
ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5, ϕ6, it is easy to see that L satisfies (Rep) and (A3) too. It only
remains to show that L satisfies (R). But observe that L is an expansion of
the implication fragment IPC→ of propositional intuitionistic logic, which
is axiomatized by ϕ1, ϕ2 and (MP) [14, Example 5.91]. Since x → x is a
theorem of IPC→, we conclude that L satisfies (R) and, therefore, that
L(α, β) 6 L. Thus we established the claim.
It is well known that a finitary logic in a language containing→ satisfies
the classical version of the deduction-detachment theorem if and only if it
is an axiomatic extension of the logic defined in its language by the axioms
ϕ1 and ϕ2 and the rule (MP) [27, Theorem 2.4.2]. Together with Claim 5.2.2,
this implies that
Γ `L(α,β) γ→ ψ⇐⇒ Γ,γ `L(α,β) ψ
for every Γ ∪ {γ,ψ} ⊆ Fm. In particular, this means that for every γ,ψ ∈
Fm:
γ a`L(α,β) ψ⇐⇒ ∅ `L(α,β) ρ(γ,ψ)⇐⇒ AlgL  γ ≈ ψ.
This fact easily implies that a`L(α,β) is a congruence of Fm. Hence we
conclude that L(α, β) is selfextensional. The fact that L(α, β) is also fully
Fregean, is a consequence of two general results of abstract algebraic
logic. First, every finitary selfextensional logic with a classical deduction-
detachment theorem is fully selfextensional [15, Theorem 4.46] (see also
[23]).3 Second, every truth-equational fully selfextensional logic is also fully
Fregean [1, Theorem 22]. 
We are now ready to state the main result on the classification of syntac-
tically presented logics in the Frege hierarchy.
Theorem 5.3. Let K be a level of the Frege hierarchy. The problem of determining
whether the logic of a given finite consistent Hilbert calculus in a finite language
belongs to K is undecidable. Moreover, the problem remains undecidable when
3In these references the classical deduction-detachment theorem is called uniterm
deduction-detachment theorem. The expression uniterm refers to the fact that this deduction-
detachment theorem is witnessed by a single formula in two variables in contrast to the
cases where the deduction-detachment theorem is witnesses by a set of formulas as in
[8, 13].
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restricted to the classification of finite consistent Hilbert calculi that determine a
finitely algebraizable logic.
Proof. Observe that the logic L(α, β) was defined starting from an arbitrary
variety V of finite type, which is finitely based and whose equational
theory in one variable is undecidable. We can assume w.l.o.g. that V is
the variety RA of relation algebras. Under this assumption, we claim that
the logic L(α, β) is consistent for every α ≈ β ∈ Eq(x). The fact that
L(α, β) is consistent when RA 2 α ≈ β has been proved in part (ii)⇒(iii) of
Theorem 5.2. Then consider the case where RA  α ≈ β. In part (iii)⇒(i) of
Theorem 5.2, we showed that L(α, β) is the logic axiomatized by only by
{ϕi : i 6 6}, (V) and (MP). Then consider any non-trivial Boolean algebra
A = 〈A,∧,∨,¬〉 and expand it to a relation algebra 〈A,∧,∨,¬, ·, ,` 1〉
by interpreting · as ∧, ` as the identity map, and 1 as the top element.
Moreover, let → be the usual Boolean implication and  be the constant
function with value 1. Let B be the result of the expansion. It is very easy
to see that 〈B, {1}〉 is a model of {ϕi : i 6 6}, (V) and (MP). Hence L(α, β)
is consistent. This establishes our claim.
Now, we turn back to the main proof, again assuming that V = RA. Let
K be a level of the Frege hierarchy. Suppose towards a contradiction that
there is an algorithm A1 which, given a finite consistent Hilbert calculus in
a finite language that moreover determines a finitely algebraizable logic,
decides whether its logic belongs to K. Then we define a new algorithm A2
as follows: given an equation α ≈ β ∈ Eq(x), we construct the logic L(α, β)
and check with A1 if it belongs to K. In the positive case A2 returns yes,
while no otherwise. Observe that we can do this, since L(α, β) is finitely
algebraizable and, by the claim, consistent. Since K contains the class of
selfextensional logics and is included in the of class of fully Fregean ones,
we can apply Theorem 5.2 obtaining that
L(α, β) ∈ K⇐⇒ RA  α ≈ β.
Therefore A2 would provide a decision procedure for the validity in RA of
equations in one variable. But this contradicts the known fact that such a
procedure does not exist [26, Section 8.5(viii)]. 
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.5. First we check that a`CR preserves the connective −.
To do this, consider ψ, ϕ ∈ Fm such that ψ a`CR ϕ: we have to prove that
−ψ a`CR −ϕ. By Lemma 4.4 it will be enough to check that −α a`CR −β
for every α a` β ∈ CR. We shall make use of some deductions. In
particular, by suitable substitutions and applying (N) and (O) to (B), (D),
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(E), (H), (I), (L) and (M), we obtain that
x · y a`CR y · x (B’)
(x + y) + z a`CR x + (y + z) (D’)
x + y a`CR y + x (E’)
x · (y + z) a`CR (x · y) + (x · z) (H’)
−(x + y) a`CR −x +−y (I’)
w +−(x · y) a`CR w + (−x · y) (L’)
w +−(x · y) a`CR w + (x · −y) (M’)
Then suppose that we are given a rule of our calculus (X), different from
(N) and (O). Then (X) is of the form w + (u · ε) a` w + (u · δ) for some
formulas ε and δ. But we have that
−(w + (u · ε)) a`CR −w +−(u · ε) (I’)
a`CR −w + (−u · ε) (L’)
a`CR −w + (−u · δ) (X)
a`CR −w +−(u · δ) (L’)
a`CR −(w + (u · δ)) (I’)
Therefore it only remains to prove the cases of (N) and (O). This is what
we do now:
−(0+ x) a`CR 0+−(0+ x) (N)
a`CR 0+ (1 · −(0+ x)) (O)
a`CR 0+−(1 · (0+ x)) (M’)
a`CR 0+ (−1 · (0+ x)) (L’)
a`CR 0+ (−1 · (x + 0)) (E)
a`CR 0+ (−1 · x) (F)
a`CR 0+−(1 · x) (L’)
a`CR 0+ (1 · −x) (M’)
a`CR 0+−x (O)
a`CR −x (N)
and
−(x + (1 · y)) a`CR −x +−(1 · y) (I’)
a`CR −x + (1 · −y) (M’)
a`CR −x +−y (0)
a`CR −(x + y) (I’)
Therefore we conclude that a`CR preserves −.
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Then we turn to prove that a`CR preserves + and · too. In order to do
this, it will be enough to show that if ψ a`CR ϕ, then χ+ψ a`CR χ+ ϕ and
χ · ψ a`CR χ · ϕ for every formula χ. Let us explain briefly why. Suppose
that this condition, call it (Y), holds. Then consider ψ1,ψ2, ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Fm such
that ψ1 a`CR ϕ1 and ψ2 a`CR ϕ2. We would have that
ψ1 + ψ2 a`CR ψ1 + ϕ2 (Y)
a`CR ϕ2 + ψ1 (E’)
a`CR ϕ2 + ϕ1 (Y)
a`CR ϕ1 + ϕ2 (E’)
and
ψ1 · ψ2 a`CR ψ1 · ϕ2 (Y)
a`CR ϕ2 · ψ1 (B’)
a`CR ϕ2 · ϕ1 (Y)
a`CR ϕ1 · ϕ2 (B’)
concluding the proof. Therefore we turn to prove that if ψ a`CR ϕ, then
χ+ ψ a`CR χ+ ϕ and χ · ψ a`CR χ · ϕ for every formula χ. Suppose that
ψ a`CR ϕ and consider an arbitrary formula χ. By Lemma 4.4, to prove
that χ+ ψ a`CR χ+ ϕ and χ · ψ a`CR χ · ϕ, it will be enough to check
that χ+ α a`CR χ+ β and χ · α a`CR χ · β for every rule α a` β in CR.
Then suppose that we are given a rule (X) of CR, different from (N) and
(O). Then (X) is of the form w + (u · ε) a` w + (u · δ) for some formulas ε
and δ. We have that
χ+ (w + (u · ε)) a`CR (χ+ w) + (u · ε) (D’)
a`CR (χ+ w) + (u · δ) (X)
a`CR χ+ (w + (u · δ)) (D’)
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and
χ · (w + (u · ε)) a`CR (χ · w) + (χ · (u · ε)) (H’)
a`CR (χ · w) + (1 · (χ · (u · ε))) (O)
a`CR (χ · w) + (1 · ((χ · u) · ε)) (A)
a`CR (χ · w) + ((χ · u) · ε) (O)
a`CR (χ · w) + ((χ · u) · δ) (X)
a`CR (χ · w) + (1 · ((χ · u) · δ)) (O)
a`CR (χ · w) + (1 · (χ · (u · δ))) (A)
a`CR (χ · w) + (χ · (u · δ)) (O)
a`CR χ · (w + (u · δ)) (H’)
Therefore it only remains to check cases (N) and (O). For what concerns
(N) we have that:
χ+ (0+ x) a`CR (0+ x) + χ (E’)
a`CR 0+ (x + χ) (D’)
a`CR x + χ (N)
a`CR χ+ x (E’)
and
χ · (0+ x) a`CR 0+ (χ · (0+ x)) (N)
a`CR 0+ (χ · (x + 0)) (E)
a`CR 0+ (χ · x) (F)
a`CR χ · x (N)
Then we turn to prove the case of (O). We have that
χ+ (x + (1 · y)) a`CR (χ+ x) + (1 · y) (D’)
a`CR (χ+ x) + y (O)
a`CR χ+ (x + y) (D’)
and
χ · (x + (1 · y)) a`CR (χ · x) + (χ · (1 · y)) (H’)
a`CR (χ · x) + (χ · (y · 1)) (B)
a`CR (χ · x) + (χ · y) (C)
a`CR χ · (x + y) (H’)
This concludes the proof that CR is selfextensional. 
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